The Russian wheat deal-hindsight vs. foresight by Clifton B. Luttrell
JULY and August 1972, the United States sold to
the Soviet Union about 440 million bushels of wheat
for approximately $700 million, more than the total
U.S. commercial wheat exports for the year beginning
in July 1971. The sales were equivalent to 30 percent
of average annual U.S. wheat production during the
previous five years and more than 80 percent of the
wheat used for domestic food during that period. The
sales involved a series of subsidized transactions fol-
lowing an agreement whereby the U.S. Government
made available credit of $750 million to Russia for
the purchase of grains over a three-year period.1 Pre-
viously, the Russians had purchased only a relatively
small quantity of U.S. farm products.
Immediately following the sales announcements, the
domestic price of wheat began to rise, and within a
few months the prices of feed and food grain, soy-
beans, and livestock turned upward and all continued
to rise at a high rate during most of the next twelve
months (Chart I). By year-end food prices had also
turned sharply upward. The price of wheat almost
tripled during the year ending in August 1973. The
prices of corn and soybeans more than doubled, and
the prices of steers, hogs, and broilers rose 55, 102,
and 153 percent, respectively (Table I). The whole-
sale price index of all farm prodncts rose 66 percent,
and the wholesale price of food increased 29 percent.2
‘Only $500 million of this credit could be outstanding at one
time.
2U.S. Department of Labor, “Wholesale Price Index” (Sep-
tember 1973)
In recent weeks most of these farm commodity prices
have declined somewhat from the mid-August 1973
levels, but retail food prices have generally continued
upward.
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A number of critics have attributed these sharp
price increases to the Russian wheat transactions. The
General Accounting Office (GAO), in a review of the
sales, questioned the United States Department of
Agriculture’s (USDA) management of the wheat ex-
port subsidy program. The GAO concluded that the
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Table I
Prices of Selected Farm Products
Percenl
8/1572 8 1573 chanpe
Wheat, per bu $ 1.51 $ 4.45 195°
Corn, per bu. 1.15 2.68 133
Cal,, per bu. .62 1.13 82
Soybeans, per bu. 336 899 168
Sleers, per cwl 35.60 55 20 55
Hogs, per cwt. 29.00 5650 102
Broilotu, live, per lb. .15 38 153
USIl \.. .l.,’,r,W,,.’o, l’,,ni A’ugL.tn7~,’
‘‘xport~ i.ibsidis \vcri’ c’xct.’ssI\r und that the salt’s
caused a dramatic rise in the price of wheat and
higher consumer prices for bread and most livestock
products. The press, in addition to attributing higher
food prices to the subsidized sales, referred to the
transactions in such terms as “the great grain rob-
bery,” “reaping the grain harvest,” and “chaff in the
great grain deal.”3
The questions raised by the critics involve both
managerial problems and basic economic issues. While
the accounting and auditing problems raised may be
important and require additional rules and procedures
for operating the program, this article deals only with
those questions which relate to basic economic issues.
The position taken by the USDA on these issues
was based on the established role of the Federal Gov-
ernment in dealing with farmers and farm commodi-
ties during most of the period since the mid-1930s.
This article reviews the role of the USDA in control-
ling farm production, supporting farm prices, and sub-
sidizing exports during this period. The Russian trans-
actions are discussed in this context, and then some
questions regarding the basic economic policies which
were followed are analyzed.
Sum’mary of Critical Comments
The GAQ conclusions, following a review of the
Russian transactions, include the following critical
elements:
(1) The USDA maintained a low target price for
wheat for several weeks after the sales began, obligat-
ing the U.S. Government to pay excessive subsidies to
~The Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the
Congress, Russian Wheat Sales and Weaknesses in Agricul-
ture’s Management of Wheat Export Subsidy Program (July
1973), pp. 2 and 25; Martha Hamilton, The Great American
Grain Robbery and Other Stories (Washington: Agribusiness
Accountability Project, 1972); Jack Anderson, “How Soviets
Pulled the Great Grain Robbery” and “Reaping the Grain
Harvest,” St. Louis Globe Democrat, July 31 and August 21,
1973, respectively; and “Chaff in the Great Grain Deal,”
Time magazine, August 6, 1973.
the private grain exporters.4 The USDA is committed
to pay over $300 million in subsidies on the Russian
and other export sales. The GAO believes that many
of these sales could have been made with smaller
subsidies.
(2) Trading rules and procedures of the USDA are
not adequate for dealing with the bargaining power of
a foreign state trading monopoly. Such agencies are
fully informed buyers and have an advantage when
dealing with partially informed individual sellers.
(3) In 1967 the USDA granted to exporters the
option of determining the date they register for sub-
sidy payments. This action, as well as other features
of the export program in effect at the time of the
recent sales, tended to minimize risks and increase
exporters’ profits.
(4) Farmers were not provided with timely infor-
mation with appropriate interpretative comments to
help them make sound marketing decisions.
(5) The USDA has not coTnprehensively evaluated
the wheat export subsidy program. Limited evalua-
tions indicating that the subsidy program was not
fully effective in reducing net export prices when the
U.S. supply situation was scarce were dismissed by
operating officials.
(6) The large volume of sales caused a dramatic
rise in the price of U.S. wheat and higher consumer
prices for bread, other flour-based products, beef,
pork, poultry, eggs, and dairy products.5
The GAO made a number of recommendations as
a result of its study. Among the recommended actions
is a review of the wheat export subsidy program in its
entirety including: a meaningful justification for the
~The key detenninant of the subsidy rate was the interna-
tional target price — the price that the USDA attempted to
maintain for U.S. wheat sold in foreign markets. Subsidies
paid by the Government to exporters kept the target or inter-
national price for U.S. wheat at less than the domestic price.
The subsidies were the difference between the domestic and
target prices.
The wheat export subsidy programs began in 1949 as a re-
sult of U.S. obligations under the International Wheat Agree-
ment. At that time, 42 nations agreed to trade a specified
amount of wheat, under a negotiated schedule of minimum
and maximum prices. Since the negotiated prices were lower
than U.S. support prices to domestic wheat farmers, the ex-
ports required heavy subsidies. During the first four years of
the program, subsidies averaged about 62 cents per bushel
and required a Government inpnt of $546 million. Before its
suspension in late 1972, the program had incurred a total
subsidy cost of about $4.3 billion for the export of about 10,5
billion bushels of wheat.
5
Comptroller General, Russian Wheat Sales, pp. 2-4, 25, 55,
and 56.
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program’s existence; a better system of coordinating
sales of agricultural commodities to countries with
nonmarket economies such as the USSR; a review of
the legality of subsidy payments on sales to foreign
affiliates of domestic exporting companies; the crea-
tion of a Government-farmer-industry committee to
provide information on foreign agricultural needs; and
a number of safeguards to assure that the amount of
the subsidies is maintained at a reasonable level if
a program review concludes that the subsidies are
needed.
Based largely on the GAO findings, the press pub-
lished statements to the effect that the subsidies were
wasteful. It was reported that the grain exporting
companies reaped large Federal subsidy payments at
the same time they were making windfall profits from
the export sales, and the transactions drained the
United States of wheat supplies, contributing to
sharply rising food prices.6 Time magazine, for ex-
ample, stated, “Consumers have a particularly good
reason for anger: the deal contributed to a grain
shortage in the U.S., driving up prices for bread, meat,
poultry, and dairy products.”7 These comments sug-
gest the following questions:
(1) Were the price increases experienced since the
Russian sales anticipated at the time of the
sales?
(2) Did it appear likely at that time that the quan-
tity of wheat purchased by the Russians could
be delivered out of surplus stock?
(3) Were the Russian sales at subsidized prices
consistent with the role assumed by the USDA
during the past two decades?
(4) Were the farm product and food price increases
a result of the sales?
Only Moderate Price Increases Antici;-,atect
There are few who question the charge of the GAO
and the press that the subsidized wheat sales to Rus-
sia reduced domestic wheat and feed supplies and
contributed to the higher food prices. Wheat can be
used for either food or livestock feed; thus, domestic
food and feed prices would not have risen as much as
they did had the subsidized sales not been made and
had the wheat been released for domestic use.
Only moderate price increases, however, were ex-
pected at the time of the sales. For example, on Au-
gust 15, 1972, six weeks after the three-year grain
sales agreement with Russia was announced and four
°Anderson, “Reaping the Grain Harvest,” August 21.
7
Time magazine, pp. 63 and 64.
weeks after the first Commodity Credit Corporation
credit sales were registered with the USDA, the fu-
tures price for May 1973 wheat at Chicago closed at
$1.85 per bushel.8 This futures price was only a few
cents per bushel above the cash price for wheat on
August 15. By May 1973, however, the cash price had
risen to $2.71 per bushel — $0.86 per bushel snore than
the market had anticipated nine months earlier.
On August 15, 1972, the futures price for corn to be
delivered in May 1973 was about $0.25 per bushel less
than the subsequent actual cash price in May 1973,
and a futures contract for May 1973 soybeans sold for
about one-half of the actual cash price for soybeans
in May. Futures prices of eggs, catfie, and hogs were
likewise well below actual cash prices on the delivery
dates.
As late as September 15, 1972, only a week before
the wheat export subsidy was removed, futures prices
for 1973 delivery reflected only moderate domestic
price increases for feed and livestock. In September
1972, wheat futures for May 1973 delivery sold for
$2.18 per bushel, corn for $1.51, and soybeans for
$3.53, somewhat above the September 1972 cash
prices, but well below the cash prices of $2.81, $1.61,
and $8.27 for wheat, corn, and soybeans, respectively,
on the delivery dates.°
Market participants, as indicated by the futures
prices, recognized that the Russian purchases would
tend to increase prices. Hence, no confusion existed
as to the direction of price movements. The amounts
of the increases, however, are only clear from “hind-
sight.” The price increases and the causal forces were
readily observed as they unfolded, but at the time of
the sales a number of factors which later affected
prices could not be observed.
Other Porces Affecting Price Increases
In September 1972, few observable indicators
pointed to the short world supply of key farm products
and the sharp price increases that subsequently oc-
curred, No widely distributed forecast indicated price
increases of 140 percent for wheat, 165 percent for
8
The ‘‘futures price” is the price of current contracts for future
deliveries of commodities. For example, the price of $8.62
per bushel agreed upon now but to be paid upon receipt of
soybeans in May 1974 is called the May futures price. For a
more complete discussion of futures prices and functions of
futures markets, see Armen A. Aichian and William II. Allen,
University Economics, 3rd ed. (Belmont, California: Wads-
worth Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 163-67.
°Cashprices used are average prices received by farmers as
reported by the USDA, Agricultural Prices. Futures prices are
prices as reported by the Wall Street Journal.
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corn, and 210 percent for soybeans by August 1973.
The 40 percent annual rate of increase in the con-
sumer price index for meat, poultry, and fish during
the first six months of this year was likewise
unforeseen.
Important supply and demand factors, other than
the wheat sales, which contributed to the price in-
creases became apparent following the wheat sales.
The sharp cutback in output of Peruvian fish meal, a
major source of protein for animal feed, was an im-
portant supply-reducing factor in the rising feed and
livestock prices. A decline in production of wheat, rice,
corn, and peanuts in other parts of the world as a
result of unfavorable weather caused a sharp increase
in the export demand for U.S. wheat, feed grains, and
soybeans. Here in the United States, output of beef
and pork rose less than expected because farmers
were adding heifers to their beef herds, and a number
of farmers had dropped their hog enterprises after
experiencing heavy losses in 1971. A realignment of
world currency values permitted greater farm com-
modity purchases from the United Stateswith a given
amount of foreign currency. In addition, the high rate
of U.S. monetary growth and the unfavorable U.S.
harvesting season in the fall of 1972 were important
forces tending to increase farm product and food
prices early this year.
The observed price increases reflected the impact
of all these largely unpredictable factors converging
at one thne. Also, in view of the nation’s extended
experience with excess supplies, neither the outlook
specialists nor the futures markets were able to pre-
dict the sharp price increases that actually occurred.
In July and August 1972 a downturn in Soviet
wheat production was indicated. Also, the Soviets had
stated that they wanted to increase meat production.
However, as pointed out by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, their buying intentions were not made known,b0
At the time of the sales, there was no certainty
about the volume of wheat exports, since it was very
late in the season before the Soviet wheat purchase
intentions became apparent.” Thus, given the export
subsidy program’s objective of reducing farm sur-
pluses, the GAO view, that much of the $300 million
obligated for export subsidies was unnecessary to
achieve the sales, may be based largely on supply
and demand factors which unfolded subsequent to the
transactions, or with the benefit of “hindsight” analysis.
10Comptroller General, Russian Wheat Sales, p. 70.
“Ibid.
Parm Program. Obie,tices —~--Iligher
Prices and Income
Increases in farm and food prices following the
sales to Russia are not sufficient reasons for criticiz-
ing the USDA. As the Secretary of Agriculture pointed
out, “Such programs exist only to protect U.S. farmers
from having to accept low world prices for a few farm
commodities which depend heavily on exports and
must meet subsidized export competition.”
Numerous public statements and congressional dec-
larations imply that the Government farm programs
are designed to achieve higher farm prices and farm
incomes than are attainable in a free market setting.”
These programs have taken several forms including
programs to increase the demand for and reduce
the supply of U.S. farm products. They include pro-
grams to increase the utilization of farm products,
such as the domestic food and farm commodity export
subsidies; programs to reduce farm production, such
as acreage allotments, marketing quotas, and land re-
tirement; programs of direct payments to farmers,
such as the payments to wool, corn, cotton, and wheat
producers; and programs designed to differentiate
markets for farm products, such as the two price plans
for certain commodities, the Government marketing
orders for fluid milk and other commodities, and the
import quota program for sugar.’4
Since 1961 about 50 million acres per year have
been withheld from crop production under the various
Government land retirement programs. This acreage
\vithheld from crop production under the various Gov-
ernment farm programs was equal to about one-sixth
of the average acreage planted to the 59 principal
crops during the decade 1961-70 inclusive and only
slightly less than one-sixth of the planted acreage
during 1971 and 1972 (Table II).
Surpluses of farm commodities arose as a result of
the Government price supports for certain basic crops.
The Government guaranteed a fixed price to farmers
through nonrecourse Commodity Credit Corporation
loans on the harvested crops. As has been pointed out
by Paarlberg, rather than learning to live with an
abundance of farm commodities at market prices, the
nation insisted on a policy of artificial scarcity by
~‘Jbid., pp. 69 and 70.
‘3See Rainer Schickele, Agricultural Policy (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 167, and Don
Paarlberg, American Farm Policy (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1964), pp. 68-72.
‘
4
For a more complete discussion of this topic, see Paarlberg,
American Farm Policy, pp. 247-328,
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Snrplnses — A Legacy of Government
Price Supports
A look at the record of the farm price support pro-
grams prior to September 1972 reveals a long record
of excess supplies of farm products — a larger quantity
produced than could be sold at the Government price
support levels. As indicated in Table III, carryovers
and surpluses of farm commodities were relatively
small in the 1926-29 period, prior to the price support
programs. The “excessive” carryover stocks only de-
veloped following the Government price supports. For
more than two decades, the USDA has administered
a system of farm price supports that maintains farm
product and food prices above free market levels. The
system provides incentive for the production of more
farm products than can clear the market despite the
accompanying production controls, domestic food sub-
sidies, Government subsidies on commercial sales
abroad, and P.L. 480 exports (sales for nonconvertible
foreign currencies and for long-term credits of
underdeveloped nations).
“Paarlberg, American Farm Policy, p. 341.
Carryover stocks of wheat into the subsequent
marketing year have often exceeded annual utiliza-
tion (amount used for both domestic and export pur-
poses). Such surplus stocks, largely held by the Gov-
ernment, exceeded total utilization in six of the twenty
years from 1953 to 1972 inclusive, and for the entire
twenty-year period carryover stocks averaged 75 per-
cent of utilization. During the five years from 1956
through 1960, carryover stocks averaged 98 percent
of annual utilization (Table III). Beginning in 1964,
the wheat surplus stocks were reduced somewhat as a
result of a new program which provided for direct
Government payments to producers and lower sup-
port prices. Since then, carryover stocks have aver-
aged only about 50 percent of annual utilization.
Carryover stocks of all feed grain (corn, oats, barley,
and grain sorghum) exceeded 40 percent of total
utilization in eight of the past twenty years and aver-
aged 37 percent of annual use for the entire period
from 1953 to 1972. Surplus stocks of cotton were also
a major problem until the past two years, averaging
80 percent of annual utilization from 1961 to 1970.
The major portion of the large carryover stocks of
recent years was held in storage by the USDA at the
taxpayers’ expense. Hence, since the early 1950s, a
major problem of the Government farm programs,
given the level of support prices, has been the disposal
of accumulated surpluses. In fact, much has been said
about the “great farm-surplus” problem — the Govern-




In view of the overall farm
program costs, any returns that
could be realized from the sur-
plus product appeared to be
cost-reducing.Total USDA out-
lays for all purposes during the
period 1967-72 inclusive ex-
ceeded $49 billion, or 4.2 per-
cent of total Federal Govern-
,nent expenditures (Table IV).
The annual outlays rose from $5.8 billion in 1967 to
$10.9 billion in 1972, or from 3.7 to 4.7 percent of
total Federal Government expenditures.
Those expenditures directly associated with efforts
to increase farm incomes, such as outlays for com-
modity price supports, acreage retirement, income
payments, and export subsidies (farm income stabili-
zation and Food for Peace), totaled $33.1 billion, or
Table II
Average Annual Acreage Withheld from Production
Under Various Government Land Retirement Programs
I9~660 1961.65 196670 1971 /2
Acreage withheld
(mu.) 1 239 57.5 53./ 500
Total acreage
planted (md 1 3307 304.4 3.04.8 31 7~”
Withheld as pdrcent
& planted ac’eage 7.2. 189 176 158
ut rn ,Ic’,I,’. sI,.’
pal s ‘ps’
~fl lala ‘al
Sunset USDA. ‘U.’ unsll sj’& ~!jt..’rrs. 1 ‘~. rI ..2, ~r’d~.‘7
pncuig I art‘I commodities at higher thall TI market levels
throughout 11w 1 alc 1930s and I QOUs)
Table Ill
Average Annual Carryover Stocks of Farm Products
IPercont af t~tiliznt,or, in Pa’ en’l-.cses I
1926 29 1953 55 195a 60 1961 65 1966 70 1971.12
Feed Groins Imil. ‘ons) 9 33 59 69 45 41
(1001 12971 l~44) 144.8) (26 ‘i 120.31
Cotton (1,000 bales) 3,038 8.846 10,20? 10,589 9,625 3,818
(20.1) 113 6~ 170.41 1807) t?9.0l (29.4)
Wheot ~miI. bu.I 185 859 1,086 1,12° 641 791
122.7y (960) (91.7) 1810) 145.41 153.21
Soybeans ~rnil. bu ) —— if 47 50 169 86
(5.5) (9 1) 1/01 (163) 16.Pl
Rice (1.000 cwt.) ‘—‘ 5,17/ 5,938 1.736 2.229 2,474
118.11 1661 3.71 1361 13.81’
‘l’~7l let,. ‘my.
S’.’i,,’’,. (.lj\, l,n’’.,i!.. em.’ ‘‘‘i’.’.’. ‘1’’:.. ‘. .l,,a>,’’t. .‘,,‘ . ,..‘‘.,‘:,IitL~,m’, ‘s. :1’
J,,..,.’..’,,,.~.,,, S ‘I’j’,!’ I’’T,, / ,,,,.o,!rn/.. —‘sr..’’:’ IC’’
..,-:.,.,.‘,,,
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about two-thirds of total USDA expenditures during
the six-year period. In addition, USDA outlays for
income security, consisting largely of food stamps (in-
tended in part to enhance domestic demand for farm
products), totaled $7.1 billion. All these expenditures
have been equivalent to about one-third of the net
farm income since 1956 (Table V) Such expenditures
have increased somewhat in recent years, but have
declined relative to total farm income since 1966.
With these sizable outlays to increase farm product
prices and farm incomes, an easy bargaining stance
with the Russians to eliminate the wheat surpluses
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Russian SuLsidies Consistent With
the System
On the basis of the evidence available at the time
of the transactions, the subsidies paid to wheat ex-
porters in 1972 appear to be consistent with past
practice. Wheat stocks carried over into the 1972-73
marketing year totaled 865 million bushels, which,
added to the 1972 estimated production of 1,551 mil-
lion bushels, resulted in total estimated supplies of
2,417 million bushels. Utilization (domestic use plus
exports) averaged only 1,516 million bushels in the
two years, 1970-71 and 1971-
72, and 1,426 million bushels
during the previous five years
(Table VI, p. 8). The supply
thus appeared adequate to
meet all foreseeable demands
at the support price level.
The USDA view that the
Russian transactions resulted
in a net saving to the Treasury
of $457 million’0 is thus con-
sistent with the farm program
objectives during a two decade
history of excessive wheat stocks. Such stocks were
often viewed as liabilities rather than assets.’~Hence,
given the basic farm program system which was de-
signed to channel more income to farmers, the USDA
acclaimed the transactions as beneficial by (1) in-
creasing the prices that farmers receive for their crops,
(2) creating new jobs, and (3) improving the balance
of trade.’8
Basic Prohle-m — A Faulty System
The basic objectives of the Government farm pro-
grams come into focus in an economic analysis of the
Russian wheat sales, The critics’ view that the sub-
sidized transactions led to higher food prices and re-
duced the well-being of U.S. consumers is in direct
opposition to the USDA view that the sales were
beneficial. Under the producer-oriented farm pro-
grams, the sales served to enhance farm incomes,
thereby achieving the programs’ major objective.
Neither the critics nor the USDA, however, seriously
suggested that the programs may not be compatible
with the economic well-being of the nation. Some
recognition of a basic problem was apparent in the
GAO’s comment on “Matters for Consideration by
the Congress:”
U.S. agriculture’s productive capacity has tradition-
ally resulted in surplus stocks which were stored at
great expense or exported with subsidy. Although
exports are important to achieving U.S. trade objec-
tives, they can have an adverse effect. Recent dra-
matic changes in the world supply-demand situation
surfaced a need for assessing agricultural exports in
a broader national context. Congress should consider
requiring that agencies develop definitive ground
rnles so that expected benefits from exports can be
appropriately weighed against their impact on vari-
ous segments of the domestic economy.1°
‘°Comptroller General, Russian Wheat Sales, p. 2.
lTpaarlberg, American Farm Policy, p. 56.
‘
8
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Table VI
Supply and Distribution of Wheat
(Data Avoilable as of August I972)~
Ave‘aq a
1965-69 1969-70 1910-71 1971 72
(nistlions of bushels)
begin,iing corryovor 627 819 885 730
Production 1,437 1.460 1,370 1,640
lmportsa 2 3 11
Total Supply 2.066 2,282 2,256 2,371
Food 515 520 $19 523
Seed 66 57 63 64
Feed (residual) 140 214 206 287
Domestic Use 721 791 788 874
ExportsZ /05 606 738 632
Commercial 356 338 506 402~
Ezpo’ts under
Govt. programs 349 268 232 179:1
Total lime 1,426 1,397 1,526 1,506
Ending carryoser 640 885 730 865
‘•V~.v bug,,,,’.,r.g Juls 1.
“heal e,:,nsalent ‘‘I Il,.,,rar,.l ‘Cc., ,,nxl,,ct,.
1.:xrI.,,l,., fIn,., ,u,..i nthe.’ ssh,at j.’exUc’ts.
U~I5A .t,nw,ut’mraf .c’a/’h~,:. 1:12. aId lth.’,t
.\.w.Lm I It’ 2
This statement, that the use of subsidies to reduce
surplus stocks of farm commodities can have an ad-
verse domestic effect, indicates recognition that the
practices reviewed should be changed. The implied
solution, however, is better ground rules for the ad-
ministration of the programs rather than a thorough
economic analysis of the issues raised. The basic eco-
nomic questions involved were not approached in the
discussion of the transactions. For example, are pro-
ducer-oriented price and income support programs
consistent with the maximum well-being of all the
people? Given that artificially high price supports to
producers tend to encourage production above
market-clearing levels, will the entire output be sold
in the absence of export subsidies?
The price system is the mechanism that brings into
equality the production and consumption of farm
products at an optimum level in a competitive econ-
omy without Government interference. Farming is
highly competitive. It meets the major competitive
tests of a large number of producers with easy enü-v
and easy exit. No single producer can have an im-
portant effect on the output or price of farm products.
‘When consumers desire more farm products, they will
bid up the price and the higher price will attract
additional resources into agriculture. Conversely,
when demand for farm products falls, prices of farm
products will decline and resources used in agriculture
will be attracted to other industries where the returns
are more favorable.
Price supports for farm products at higher than
market-clearing levels, or other methods designed to
enhance farm incomes above levels determined by
free market prices, alter the normal relationships be-
tween resources used in production and consumption.
Both high support prices and farm income supple-
ments attract excessive resources into agriculture from
alternative uses. High support prices alone provide
the incentive to produce more farm commodities than
will clear the market at the support price level. Fur-
thermore, all the methods of farm income support
reduce the economic well-being of the nonfarm sector
of the economy, and are of doubtful long-run benefit
to farm workers. Hence, it is not only the expected
benefits from exports that should be weighed against
their unfavorable impact on various segments of the
domestic economy; rather, it is all losses from reduced
nonfarm output, higher food prices, and higher tax
payments to finance the farm programs that must be
weighed against the probability of enhanced incomes
to individual farm workers. Since returns to labor and
other resources tend toward equality in a competitive
economy, any gains occurring to farm workers through
price or income supports are likely to be of short dura-
tion unless a monopoly position can be maintained
through control of entry.
Tire iVew Farm Bill
Some unfavorable impacts of the farm programs on
the well-being of most people were apparently recog-
nized in the four-year farm bill passed by Congress in
August of this year. Most crop production restrictions
have been removed, and income and price support
payments are likely to be less than in recent years.
Wheat farmers are not required to abide by conserva-
tion reserves, and there is no conserving base or set-
aside acreage requirement for grain or cotton
plantings.
Crop allotments remain intact for most basic crops
hut are only a means for determining the acreage on
which supplemental payments will be made in case
the market price drops below the target price. Current
market prices for most farm products are well above
“target” prices which would trigger off the payments.
Target prices are set for 1974 at $2.05 per bushel for
wheat, $1.38 per bushel for corn, $2.34 per cwt. for
milo, $1.13 per bushel for barley, and $0.38 per pound
for cotton.
While it is difficult to estimate the cost of the pro-
gram in terms of direct Treasury disbursements, most
analysts believe that it will be well below farm pro-
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gram costs of recent years. Furthermore, the less re-
strictive farm program coupled with the lower supple-
mental payments in prospect should enhance the well-
being of farmers, other taxpayers, and consumers.
Sum:rnary and Conclusions
In summation, the recent sharp increase in food
prices has brought the 1972 Russian wheat sales and
the wheat export subsidy program to the attention of
the public. The discussion in the press has centered
partly around the administrative details of the trans-
actions, but some basic economic issues have been
involved in the debate. The use of subsidies to export
wheat has been questioned, since such exports tend to
reduce the domestic grain supply and increase prices
of food used at home.
The wheat surpluses, which were exported, accrued
as the result of a national policy of maintaining high
price supports to wheat producers. Similar export
subsidies had been used by the USDA for more than
two decades to reduce surplus stocks, and the recent
subsidies were generally consistent with accepted
practice. The objective of the farm programs was
higher farm prices and incomes. Prices rose following
the Russian sales, but the extent of the increases was
not anticipated because of a series of other factors, all
of which tended to increase farm product prices.
The critics accused the USDA of contributing to
higher food costs by subsidizing the sales. The sales
no doubt tended to increase farm product and food
prices, but the USDA cannot be faulted on this
charge. Most of the Government farm programs in
effect during the past two decades were designed to
increase farm product prices even though higher food
prices were a consequence of the programs. Thus,
from the USDA’s view, the sales were beneficial since
they contributed to higher farm prices and incomes.
Furthermore, there have been few critics of these
USDA actions — actions which have caused artificially
higher prices in the past. Even critics of the Russian
wheat sales did not discuss the underlying problem.
They complained primarily of faulty USDA opera-
tions, whereas the real culprit was a faulty system of
farm income and price support programs. These pro-
grams contribute to higher food prices and are waste-
ful of scarce resources. They provide incentive for the
use of more resources in agriculture than is consistent
with a level of output that can be sold at market
prices. They are of doubtful benefit to farm workers
and tend to reduce the output of nonfarm goods and
services and the well-being of most segments of the
population.
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